Between 18 and 20 May 2017, Ucall organized its second biennial international conference, titled ‘Accountability and International Business Operations: Providing Justice for Corporate Violations of Human Rights, Labor and Environmental Standards’. The conference included presentations by various keynote speakers and panelists, a stakeholders’ roundtable and a PhD masterclass (see the programme). In this post, some tentative conclusions of the conference are offered.
On 2 May 2017, Jelle Leunis obtained his PhD in political science from the Free University of Brussels (VUB) on the accountability of private military and security companies (PMSCs), a topic that in this past has proved of interest to UCall too. The full title of the thesis is: ‘The regulatory governance of armed force: Holding private military and security companies to account’. I had the honor to be a member of the examination committee. In this post, I set out, and subscribe to Leunis’s view that the fetishization of legal mechanisms to hold PMSCs to account has overshadowed the question of how to involve citizens in PMSC-based security governance. Enhancing the political-democratic accountability of the use of PMSCs has obvious merit, but further research will be needed regarding how such accountability could be enhanced for affected populations in conflict areas.
On 28 April 2017, Sofia Barros successfully defended her PhD at Leuven University on the topic of the responsibility of member states in the context of their participation in international organizations (full title: “Governance as Responsibility – Member State Participation in International Financial Institutions and the Quest for Effective Human Rights Protection”). I had the honor of being the co-supervisor of this thesis. In this post, I draw attention to the novelty of the author’s conceptualization of member states as autonomous actors within international organizations. Her approach is unique in that she demonstrates that conferring separate legal personality on international organizations does not negate the abiding role played by member states in those international organizations, with the attendant consequences for responsibility. Lees verder
On 21 April 2017, the Court of Appeal of ‘s-Hertogenbosch convicted Dutch businessman Guus Kouwenhoven to 19 years of imprisonment for, inter alia, complicity in war crimes committed in Liberia. In the late 1990s Kouwenhoven had provided arms to the murderous regime of the Liberian president Charles Taylor, who was later convicted to 50 years of imprisonment by the Special Court of Sierra Leone. This is a rare example of a domestic court holding a corporate actor liable for involvement in the commission of international crimes abroad. In line with the recent Corporate Crimes Principles of the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, a corporate actor is defined as a ‘corporate entity or individual acting on behalf of a corporate entity’.. It bears emphasis that Kouwenhoven, while directing a corporate entity, was convicted in his individual capacity. In the Netherlands Kouwenhoven is not a unique case; earlier, another businessman, Frans van Anraat, who had sold raw materials for the production of chemical weapons to Saddam Hussein, was also convicted of complicity in war crimes (upheld on appeal). The Kouwenhoven case highlights again the potential of complicity to hold criminally to account Western corporate actors who ‘recklessly’ accept the risk that their business dealings with warlords could contribute to the commission of international crimes. The next challenge will be how to prosecute corporate entities rather than individual businessmen for their involvement in international crimes.
On 20 January 2017, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over claims brought by two trade unions against the European Patent Organization (EPO), an international organization (partly) based in The Hague. The Court held that the organization enjoyed immunity from the jurisdiction of Dutch courts in accordance with the EPO Protocol on Privileges and Immunities. This judgment puts an end to a drawn-out and highly public case which threw the spotlight on the poor employment conditions in the EPO, including apparent restrictions of employees’ right to strike and to participate in EPO decision-making. The Supreme Court could be criticized for upholding the organization’s immunity in this case. However, from a systemic point of view, it is heartening that the Court affirmed the principle that conferring immunity from jurisdiction should not affect the very essence of a claimant’s right of access to justice, enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In future cases, claimants can continue to rely on Article 6 ECHR to challenge acts of international organizations before Dutch courts. As far as the EPO case is concerned, it is hoped that, even if the EPO’s immunity was upheld, the Dutch litigation serves as a wake-up call to push through important reforms within the organization.
Last week, Justice Fraser writing for the London High Court dismissed Okpabi v. RDS and SPDC, a claim of a group of Nigerian plaintiffs against Anglo-Dutch oil giant Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary. This dismissal has prompted strong responses by NGOs involved in the region such as Amnesty International, calling it a severe setback for victims in their search for remedies against corporate human rights violations. This contribution shortly looks at the decision on jurisdiction in this case, and how it contrasts against comparable cases on some procedural and substantive issues.
Op 16 januari 2017 heeft Oekraïne een langverwachte zaak tegen Rusland formeel aanhangig gemaakt bij het Internationaal Gerechtshof (IGH), waarbij het de Russische inmenging in Oekraïense aangelegenheden aan de kaak stelt. Oekraïne voert aan dat Rusland verschillende schendingen van het internationaal recht jegens Oekraïne heeft begaan, met name van het Verdrag inzake de Financiering van Terrorisme en het Rassendiscriminatieverdrag. De zaak betreft een groot aantal incidenten, maar relevant is dat deze ook het neerhalen van de MH17 bestrijkt. De zaak is niet bij voorbaat kansloos, al zal Oekraïne eerst over een aantal procedurele en inhoudelijke hordes moeten springen. Lees verder
On 30 November 2016, I served as a member of the reading committee at Sciences Po in Paris which conferred a PhD in law on Bogdan Ivanel for his work on puppet states. Mr Ivanel rightly draws attention to the serious accountability problems confronting the current phenomenon of puppet states. Puppet states are secessionist entities located on the territory of one state (the ‘mother state’) but are more or less controlled by another state (the ‘sponsor state’). While the puppet typically has its own governmental institutions and largely functions as a de facto state, it is not normally recognized by the international community. In fact, it can be considered as an extension of the sponsor state, which may occupy the puppet’s territorial base. Most puppet states have been established on the territory of the former Soviet Union, e.g., Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Eastern Ukraine. Given the current geopolitical stalemate, these entities are not going away any time soon. Thus, it makes sense to take them seriously, or at least to open the debate regarding their accountability towards the citizens they ‘govern’. Accountability for human rights abuses committed on the puppet’s territory, should be realized through a combination of holding the sponsor state, the mother state, and the puppet state itself responsible.
The Dutch Office of the Prosecutor (Landelijk Parket) announced on 12 November 2016 that the Netherlands had extradited two Rwandan nationals to Rwanda, which suspects them of involvement in the 1994 genocide. The way for these extraditions was cleared by the Hague Court of Appeal, which on 5 July 2016 decided that extradition to Rwanda did not violate the suspects’ human rights (decision only available in Dutch). The decision confirms an international pattern of deference to Rwanda in extradition proceedings and of rejection of human rights challenges to extradition. It is to be applauded in that it takes account of the important strides which Rwanda has made with respect to due process protections in the criminal law. Giving the benefit of the doubt may pay important long-term dividends in terms of rule of law learning in a post-conflict state such as Rwanda.
Het zal weinigen ontgaan zijn: afgelopen week diende in Londen de zaak R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU over de route die de Britse regering had gekozen voor de Brexit-procedure, het vertrek van het Verenigd Koninkrijk uit de EU. Kort samengevat was de intentie van de regering-May om artikel 50 van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie (TEU), dat lidstaten mogelijk maakt uit de EU te stappen, in te roepen zonder tussenkomst van het Britse Parlement. Het Britse Hof (High Court) heeft de regering nu teruggefloten; het inroepen van artikel 50 kan alleen nadat het parlement daarmee heeft ingestemd. Door de resulterende herrie in het Parlement en de media lijkt de juridische dimensie van de zaak echter onder te sneeuwen. Dat is jammer, want die raakt een aantal fundamentele belangen. Het is goed deze eens even door te lopen. Lees verder